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CHRISTOPER L. SALTER: Thank you, David. Welcome back, for those that, in fact, were here and 
are back. Welcome aboard, for those who are newly arrived at this session. Let me make a 
couple of comments on things that happened this morning that were left unresolved. First of 
all, for those of you who would be interested in seeing a copy of “Scoring Los Angeles 
Landscapes,” which is the curriculum packet that I’ve just given my institute this Monday—this 
is our first week of our second year, now—I’d be pleased to send you a copy of this package of 
environmental educational materials relating to Los Angeles in a specific sense, but to urban 
environmental education in a generic sense, for only one request. If you send me a letter on 
your college or high-school or grade-school letterhead saying that you would like to make use 
of these materials for consideration of introducing environmental education into some part of 
the curriculum in your school, I would be happy to make available to you an edited copy upon 
completion of the summer institute, and then our rewriting it as we’ve tested it. Additionally, to 
those who don’t want to wait for that, I’m happy to say that I’ve been able to get money to 
fund five of the teachers that worked last summer with me in the first year of the institute to 
rewrite their curriculum packets. 
 
The curriculum packets were the goal product of the institute last summer, for the teachers. 
They had to create class outlines that involve lecture outlines, behavioral objectives, handouts, 
and methods of evaluation, including field trip logs. These little packets are being produced 
now, being edited now; [by] July 31 I hope to get them, by mid-September I’ll have them edited 
and printed, and Rudy Schaefer has given us some money to disseminate these materials, 
primarily in California, but I’d be glad to slip a few into the mail through UCLA’s franking system 
to friends in Portland, if I thought it might introduce or help introduce urban environmental ed 
into your school systems. 
 
Although they’re L.A.-specific, they’re only L.A.-specific so that the community focus can be 
comprehended by the people using them there. The themes, the guts, the basic infrastructure 
of the curriculum packets are talking about any urban landscape. I have one beginning biology 
class that’s doing a packet; I have a social studies class, eighth grade; I have a tenth-grade urban 
ecology class; I have a ninth-grade history and geography class; and I have one secondary 
school overall packet all in the mill right now. So, write to C.L. Salter, Department of Geography, 
UCLA, L.A. 90024, and say “blah blah blah,” and I’ll be happy to make these things available to 
you as I have them ready. Salter, Geography, UCLA, L.A. 90024.  
 
Secondly, I want to mention one theme that I just touched on in some of the discussions but 
didn’t parlay into any, I think, substantive comment this morning, and then we’ll turn… for 
those that are newly arrived, my apologies for this digression. I mentioned mental maps a few 
times, and at lunch time some of you questioned me, “What is a mental map?” And I wish I 
could say a mental map is really the product of creative geographers, it probably comes as 
many our verities through other disciplines, but it’s fundamentally an exercise in having 
somebody write down on paper—chart with pencil or pen and paper—their images of some 
movement through space, or space as it exists. I could have asked you at the outset, for 
example, to give me a mental map of Portland, saying, “I’m a new person in Portland, I need 
have some idea of what are the kinds of landscape markers,” or what are called environmental 
cues, C-U-E-S, and that would have been a mental map. If you would have given me some of the 
things that are common here, whether it’s a river or whether it’s a bridge, whether it’s the 
Lloyd Center, or whatever, those kinds of things would have told me more than just about the 
landscape; it would have told me about the kinds of things that you perceive as important as 
you make your route from beginning to end, from home to school, from school to the Lloyd 
Center, from the Lloyd Center to the bar, or whatever your path is. 
 
And the mental map, it can be used at any age level. I’ve used it in third grade successfully, and 
I’ve used it with my graduate students at the university. It’s a nice shorthand to their 
environmental literacy, to their ability to see and recall and then describe landscape, and it can 
be… the scale can be as small as, when I worked with third grade for a semester, I had them 
start out making a mental map just of the table, what’s on the table, so they get into the 
mapping idea of being able to see and translate. And it can be as complex as “What route does 
your bus go, what route do you bike, what route do you walk from home to school?” And then 
you can tell, by the kinds of things they put down, something about the kinds of thoughts they 
have, the kinds of things they see. That’s what our goal is, trying to understand thoughts and 
things that they see.  
 
Finally, one of you said… you sound as though you’re concerned about field trips a lot; can’t 
they just turn into larks, not particularly productive? The field trips that we use for the institute, 
“Scoring Los Angeles Landscapes,” or for the first and second year UCLA Urban Environmental 
Education Institutes, these summer sessions, the field trips are prepared by—that is they are 
prefaced by—considerable comment on the sorts of areas we’re going to be seeing, and then 
asking the students, “What are your goals? What do you want to see in that landscape?” If 
we’re going to the City of Commerce, for example, in downtown Los Angeles, what do you 
expect to see in a place called City of Commerce? If we’re going to the San Fernando Valley, 
what kinds of things do you think you’ll see in the San Fernando Valley? Picking up again on 
mental maps, their images of that valley. And we try to organize those, include some in the trip, 
and then talk about them, and then relate them to the larger ecosystem of Los Angeles. Then 
finally, the trip itself is accompanied by the scoring sheet, they all have these scoring cards, so 
they score environment, they tally up the points in which they feel it is strong or it is weak, and 
that we discussed this morning a little bit. Then finally, after the field trip, the follow-up is spent 
reviewing, in both meanings of the word: reviewing the landscapes they’ve been through, and 
integrating what they’ve seen, what they’ve learned, with the overall curriculum goals of a 
certain timeframe. I’ll talk more about that in the discussion period if you want, because I find a 
field trip without some preparation, without some conclusion, has much less significance and 
impact than a field trip that is just winged. Although we’ve all winged trips, they’re better if you 
can prepare the people and follow them up.  
 
All right. As David suggested, I’m going to change the format just a minor bit, because I have 
written these two short papers for the sessions, this morning’s session and this afternoon 
session, and my understanding was they would be the axis around which the morning turned, 
because you would have seen them, and then we would’ve talked about them. I was intrigued 
to find out that, in fact, you’ve not seen these. The one on this afternoon, Lessons From the 
Landscape: Third World City Building, I’m going to share with you now, and I know how dry-
mouth and tight that makes you all feel, but I’ll read it with as much energy as I can, and just 
because something is read doesn’t mean it’s dumb. Don’t think that things that are read, 
necessarily, either, have to be dull or whatever. These are the ideas we’re after, we’re now 
trying to concern ourselves with experiments in urban packaging that are not American, that 
are coming from other countries, and I will then follow this up with graphics on Chinese city 
experimentation, and a short film that gives you a wholly different perspective, as Third World 
nations have on the urban container. 
 
Lessons From the Landscape: Third World City Building. A decade ago, Stanley Meisler of the 
L.A. Times wrote of the process of African city growth in these terms:1 “The African is drawn to 
the cities by more than economics. The city has become the only symbol of the modern world 
to the African brought up in his peasant world. In a sense, he can move from the Middle Ages…” 
[changing tone] Hey, I don’t care if you’re here, but if you’re here, give me the quiet, okay? You 
can wait in the room and play the game if you want, that’s cool, but let me just read. “The 
African is drawn to the cities by more than economics. The city has become the only symbol of 
                                               
1 Salter is reading [and paraphrasing] from an article by Stanley Meisler which began on page 1 of the Los Angeles Times, November 17, 1968. 
the modern world to the African brought up in his peasant world. In a sense, he can move from 
the Middle Ages to the twentieth century by going to the city. If an African has had a few years 
of schooling, if his imagination has been excited by newspapers and the radio, if he feels a need 
to break from his traditional ways, if he wants to be modern, there is only one place he can go, 
and that is to the city. And he will go there even when it does not make economic sense to go 
there.” Although the phrase “he can move from the Middle Ages to the twentieth century by 
going to the city” overlooks the city, overlooks the influence the city has had on peasant 
communities with the telecommunication network of urban centers, the rest of the scenario is 
accurate. Pell-mell migration, from not only the countryside, but also smaller cities and towns 
has been the characteristic movement in the majority of third world countries since World War 
2. The theme of this paper is to view the ways in which urban experiments outside the United 
States have dealt with such movement. Are there lessons from the landscape and the process 
of urbanization in the third world which might benefit our own urban scene? 
 
Our approach to an understanding of this additional international aspect of the continuing 
urban enigma is focused upon three themes. The first perspective is a commentary on the 
current realities of contemporary urbanization in the Third World. The second one deals with 
an analysis of the most ambitious domestic mobility program ever tried. Speculations on yet 
additional experiments will characterize the third perspective. The trio of concerns: present 
reality, mobility management, and possibilities for the future will provide us with the ideas we 
need for better comprehending mankind’s rush to the city.  
 
The first perspective: realities of contemporary urbanization in the Third World. In the initial 
rush to the cities in the mid-nineteenth century Europe, there was a strong influence worked on 
peasant societies by two primary forces: enclosure, a legal closing of many of the common 
lands that had traditionally afforded a farming and grazing base for marginal farmers, forced 
masses of farmers to abandon farming as a livelihood. The consequential and second influence 
was the establishment of ever larger textile mills. The combination of diminished access to one 
resource concurrently with the yoking of a wage-earning alternative for unskilled labor began 
the greatest domestic migration stream that the European world had ever known. It was in this 
era that the true process of urbanization began, even though the roots of urbanism stretched 
back to the ceremonial and trade cities of the Eastern reaches of the Mediterranean and South 
Asia. The significance in that dual shift in the forces of location meant that, in a general sense, 
there was a fundamental complementarity between the countryside and the cityside. 
Consequently, the demographic shifts that occurred to begin city building in an expansive 
manner were characterized by increases in productivity of the human populations. While the 
detailed chronicle of these massive migrations would take note of many economic and social 
dislocations, the overall process proved to be an efficient transfer of manpower from a rural 
setting to an urban setting. There has not been the same complementarity in the contemporary 
rush of peasants and farmfolk away from farmlands and hamlets to major metropolitan centers 
in the Third World.  
 
Quoting again from Meisler’s observant article: “The attraction to the cities in the migrations 
today has very often been the high life: schools, bicycles, doctors, jazz, shoes, and cash.” The 
differences in the resulted urban patterns are the sources for many of the landscape images 
created by Third World cities. One example is the street hawkers, trying to generate enough 
cash to live on by the sales of single cigarettes, small quantities of fruit, used clothing, flowers, 
or perhaps personal services such as car washing or myriad domestic tasks. Crowded squatter 
settlements, barrios, favolas, shanty towns with their associated high population densities, poor 
facilities, inadequate access to municipal services, relatively high incidence of disease and 
sickness come to mind as another of these commonly imagined scenes. Perhaps the more tragic 
and graphic among these associated images is the beggar, the destitute mother, the 
malnourished child or father who has been driven to petty crime in the face of continued and 
defeating unemployment. These are the street people who constitute a highly imageable 
minority in these cities that attract far more people than they can productively support. 
  
Settings such as these have led to the worldwide concern over problems of population. In the 
case of United States urbanization, there has been a steady decline in the rates of fertility of 
city populations, as families react to higher space costs, diminished household usefulness of 
children—as opposed to the traditional chore-orientation of rural children—and the relatively 
widespread information on family planning. In the Third World, however, there has been a 
demographically significant lag in cultural adaptation to the city. Village patterns have been 
retained, particularly in the most densely crowded shanty towns, and the trend toward lower 
fertility has not been realized. At the same time, however, there have been marked decreases 
in mortality. The net result is higher, not lower, rates of population growth in many of the cities 
and urban areas of the underdeveloped world. 
 
This phenomenon has made a crowded situation not only crowded, but young and crowded. 
This has been seen increasingly as explosive politically. To summarize this press of people into 
urban spaces, look at the following three tables. The phenomenon of urbanization in the Third 
World is outlined in these basic demographic facts. [through laughter] Here are the three tables 
that you can refer to. They basically show that the Third World—that is, the so-called 
underdeveloped countries or less developed countries or rapidly developing countries—have 
had an urbanization factor in the last several decades, three and four times the urbanization 
press in the primary world that we focus on, the American and Western European world. It also 
shows not only is there an urbanization trend that gives them pell-mell migration to the cities, 
but it shows that the migration to the cities in these Third World nations has been focused on 
several cities, or what Mark Jefferson calls the primate city, the major city. It’s not dispersed 
through a whole range of cities, each one absorbing a certain and accommodating percentage 
of the rural migrants, it’s rather the pushes toward Calcutta, the pushes toward Caracas, the 
pushes toward Barranquilla, the pushes toward Rio, giving them a special crowding, and it gives 
us then, also, a pattern of a very heavy role being played by recent migrants to the current 
urban crunch in Third World nations. These tables will be available to you who are taking the 
course by xeroxes I’ll leave with Dr. Clark, and you can pick them up.  
 
The first perspective, then, points out that the same images of high density that we have for 
American cities are valid for other parts of the world. It is essential, however, to focus more on 
pedestrians than on automobiles in the foreign cities. It is essential to think in terms of 15-40% 
as being unemployed, instead of the 5-15% in the United States. And the pace with which these 
Third World urban landscapes are moving toward crisis is exacerbated by the unparalleled 
rapidity with which town and foreign populations are moving to the major cities, even if there is 
no certainty of being able to share in the high life of “schools, bicycles, jazz, shoes, and cash.” 
 
As in the case of our own urban settings, struggle is built into the decision for the city. Let us 
turn to an example of a nation which has stopped this diseconomic flow of peasants to the city, 
and has tried to accommodate the millions who have already made the transition from peasant 
farmer to city wage laborer. And this is the second perspective: Chinese experiments in mobility 
management and urban space. In the years following the success of Mao Zedong and the 
Chinese communist party, there was considerable social experimentation in the countryside. By 
1956, the communists had advanced along the road of communization in the agrarian sector so 
far as to unsettle literally millions of Chinese peasants. These farmers, who were not welcoming 
mutual aid teams, rural cooperatives, and the unprecedented calls for participation in village-
wide agricultural campaigns, had begun to come to the cities. Motivated primarily by 
uneasiness over the uncertainty of the direction of innovation in the countryside, they came to 
the city with neither industrial skills nor knowledge of job opportunity. 
 
Simultaneously, the Chinese government began an active campaign of expansion in the heavy 
industrial sector of the well-established cities along the eastern seaboard of the country. 
Responding to Russian experience in their own interior, the Chinese also promoted the growth 
of new industrial centers and the expansion of moderate-sized cities in the northeast, the 
northwest, and along major inland waterways. There was, therefore, a dual impetus to a 
significant increase in China’s urban population. As in the case of both the so-called 
undeveloped and underdeveloped world, the major cities received the great bulk of the 
migrants, while less dominant centers grew more modestly. 
 
By the mid-1950s, the Chinese realized that the street people problem of Shanghai, Canton, 
Tianjin, and other large cities was growing too rapidly and too unproductively. It was with this 
realization that the Chinese introduced a major effort to stem the migration flow from the 
countryside to the city. There was a campaign called hsia fang, or “downward transfer”—H-S-I-
A F-A-N-G, if you want a phonetic “hsia fang,” or really S-H-A F-A-N-G, “sha fang.” With the 
advent of this program, Chinese peasants were not allowed to move casually into the city, and 
people who had no productive urban niche were subjected to being sent back to the 
countryside. Additionally, urban bureaucrats who the party felt had grown too distant from 
rural realities were made to participate in hsia fang, and pass a tour of duty as a working, 
producing member of China’s peasant farm population. By these programs, not only were the 
cities freed of some of their unemployed people, but peasants quickly learned that unless they 
had a potential job to accommodate them in the central city, in the city, they could anticipate 
being sent back to the rural world. Tens of millions of people have been moved by this 
program, and it has done a reasonable job of controlling spontaneous migration from the rural 
sector to the urban centers in the People’s Republic of China.  
 
The second innovation in the management of urban spaces has been the Chinese effort to 
establish urban communes. Just as virtually all resources were brought under the jurisdiction of 
the commune administration in the 1958 initiation of rural communes, so too were their 
experiments with urban communes. That is, joint ownership of houses and even household 
goods in a variety of localized, urban, communal situations. While one obvious aspect of the 
communization of the forces of production in the city was the state management of factories, 
the urban commune movement was an effort to organize cities into coherent sectors by 
employment. Workshops were created to employ family members of factories—families—and 
those… [starts sentence over] Workshops were created to employ family members of factory 
populations, and these small furniture factories, boat repair sheds, waste retrieval groups and 
the like, were all located in the shadows of the major factories. Shops, cafes, mess halls, 
department stores, and repair facilities were not only linked through an economic 
interdependency, but they also served as the basis for social cohesion. 
 
City people were bound together by location, as well as by vocation. The analog to this, 
obviously, is a mining company town, an Appalachian coal town, or a Butte, Montana mining 
community. In Chinese cities, this meant the breaking down of traditional courtyard walls, for 
example, to establish the communal nature of urban populations. What were once apartments, 
in a facetious but not totally inaccurate phrase, have now been described as “togetherments.” 
The Chinese were hoping to create a new unity within its urban population, so that groups 
would work more effectively and productively in the factory because of the social bond they 
felt in their newly organized urban setting. In a setting which had traditionally been so 
fragmented that there was little sense of community in the urban industrial population, this 
was an attempt to replicate some of the… farmers’… [stumbling over the words] harvest time 
comradery. That’s funny, it was just a small lunch, shouldn't do all that… [laughter in 
background] …Replicate some of the farmers’ harvest time comradery. 
 
The third aspect of Chinese urban experimentation came in their totally new design of urban 
space. Because one of the primary social goals of Mao Zedong was the diminishment of class 
lines between rural people and city folk, the Chinese tried to modify away the traditionally clear 
markers of city space and countryside. In new cities founded after 1949, and especially in the 
1960s, efforts were made to force factory workers to produce their own foodstuffs. At the 
same time, local farming populations were given tours of duty in urban factory settings, so that 
they also could see what the tasks of the other sector were. These new cities, or what I call 
“agripolitan centers” were an additional innovation in urban design. They resulted in reducing 
the impetus to migrate to the city, because many of the same tasks which made country life so 
wearisome were required of new city dwellers also. At the same time, city people tended to 
better understand the rigors of rural living, and this potentially reduced this friction between 
the urban and rural sector. Like Ebenezer Howard’s English Garden Cities or New Towns, not 
enough of these agripolitan centers were established to determine the ultimate value of these 
new approaches to city design, but at least the Chinese focused their anxieties about random 
and unpaced city growth adequately to create social and governmental policy that changed the 
landscape. 
 
Migration control, governmentally encouraged programs to return to the countryside, and 
short-term rural residence for urbanites and bureaucrats, and efforts at the creation of city 
centers to produce both crops and industrial goods are then three of the experiments which 
the People’s Republic of China has developed in an attempt to modify common Third World 
patterns of contemporary urban growth. Whether or not the United States can learn from 
these lessons in the landscape will be considered at the conclusion of the third perspective. And 
the third perspective is: design alternatives for new cities in the Third World.  
 
Great demographic inequities have been created by the migrational flow of peasant peoples in 
the third world. Not only has the countryside been abandoned at an increasing rate, but large 
areas which have otherwise been developed, possibly, for farmland have been left un-
pioneered. As the primate cities of the lesser-developed nations grow so large as to appear 
unmanageable, vast tracts of marginal and potentially arable land go underutilized or even 
unpeopled. Since cities have been the cause for such a pattern, some nations have attempted 
to use cities to modify such a phenomenon. In Brazil and Pakistan, for two examples, a great 
amount of development money has been expended in the creation of totally new urban 
centers. These major cities, both national capitals, have not been enlarged from modest-sized 
cities, but have been sculpted from raw space. In both cases, the new cities were designed to 
move people away from overcrowded, established capital cities and toward new urban centers. 
These centers, however, were sited in the midst of open lands, very distant from the traditional 
clusters of urban population. In such a siting and setting, it has been hoped that the peasant 
quest for the high life of the city could be met by these new centers. 
 
If the migration streams which had traditionally flowed to long-established centers could be 
redirected toward these recent creations, there would be a number of benefits. The old cities, 
for example, would witness a slow-down in the in-migration of peasants and refugees from 
smaller cities as people began to turn to the new capitals, Islamabad and Brasilia. The new cities 
would gain some of the flash and excitement of the traditional primate cities because of the 
entertainment and high society that follows centers of national government. The whole 
universe of employment that springs up around a massive governmental center would attract 
potential cityward migrants, but in the case of these two cities, there would have been prior 
planning done to accommodate the inflows of such people. The common images of crowding, 
shanty towns, poor facilities, could be replaced by the site of a people arriving at a newly 
constructed major city with a reasonable chance for shelter and employment for many, if not 
for all. Finally, an additional hope of this inland migration has been that the very process itself 
of movement toward the new capital would cause people to begin to fill up the interior spaces 
of Brazil and Pakistan. In the course of a migration toward a distant city, numerous people find 
haven in smaller cities, towns, hamlets, and even farms. Such a process would begin to 
populate, and hence make more productive, major areas of the nation that have not been 
heretofore developed. 
 
Unfortunately, not all of the intentions of these innovations have been realized. Even with the 
construction of new cities, the worker sheds of cardboard and scrap metal have been 
maintained as the most inexpensive zone of transition to the new city. Migration flows to 
Islamabad in Pakistan and Brasilia in Brazil have been less than dramatic, in part because the 
government officials have themselves been loath to leave the well-established capitals of Rio 
and Karachi. Development of the empty spaces that lie between the old capital and new has 
not been especially productive, because peasant knowledge of farmland potentials has already 
told much of the agrarian population that these lands are idle because they need too much 
fertilizer, too much irrigation, or are plagued by pest and animal problems which make farming 
easier and more productive in the traditional zones. Patterns of the past, or so it seems, have a 
powerful hold on even the most adventurous. 
 
There has been, however, a demographic shift of some consequence worked by these new 
capital cities. The new centers have been harassed by some of the same problems as the 
traditional capitals, but this Third World experiment does show a willingness to be innovative 
and exploratory in dealing with the crushing problems of what some call “the hyper-
urbanization” of some sectors of the lesser-developed countries. 
 
Final, additional experiments can be summarized in short, thematic fashion to suggest areas of 
innovation. The Chinese, for example, have two other urban policies that could have significant 
impact on not only the Third World, but on our scene as well. In the continued development of 
urban space, the private automobile will not be introduced in any significant scale. Public 
transportation built around busses and trolleys and some subways will move the people to and 
from labor. Some factories, in addition, run open trucks to pick up and return employees. The 
use of the automobile is limited primarily to governmental services for foreigners. Small, 
regional centers with industrial capacity for the production of chemical fertilizers, small 
gasoline engines, farm implements, furniture, have been tried in Cuba and in the PRC. These 
efforts to better supply local regions with the industrial goods which an agrarian and small town 
society has need of reduces some of the impetus to migrate to massive urban centers. Some of 
the benefits of urban proximity are brought to the countryside by the establishment of such 
local, mini industrial nodes. 
 
The cultural ambiance of an area changes as even the most modest of urban influences are 
introduced into the rural landscape. Modular housing, rural recreation centers, broadly 
distributed rural health clinics, increased proliferation of educational facilities, and countless 
other attempts at changing the image of the countryside and the reality of the city are being 
experimented with in the Third World. Justification for these programs comes from the lessons 
that the landscape of the so-called developed world present to this third world. The chaos of 
our American cities serves as a guideline, even a headline, albeit negative, for innovation and 
experimentation in other countries. We are tutors through difficult examples. 
 
The remaining question here, then, is: can we learn from other nations’ experiments? Do we 
have the flexibility in our planning, construction, and funding agencies to respond to creative 
and effective remedies to universal, urban ills? If we can look abroad and reverse the traditional 
role of host and donor, and see ourselves as benefitting from the innovative designs in urban 
space in the Third World, then we have significantly enlarged our choices in solving the urban 
enigma. These lessons from the landscape could radically redirect our own course of urban 
alternatives.  
 
[changing tone; no longer reading aloud] When I was in China last summer, we had as part of 
the official delegation of American geographers, ten of us for the month of August in China, had 
the responsibility of listening to talks. And the Chinese have not learned the importance of a 
thing called a lectern, which camouflages the thickness of a person’s paper, which is very 
critical, and so they’d get up with something like this and the fellow would start reading and 
after you’d heard about the first ten lines you start thinking, “My God, how far is he going to go 
in this thing?” and then by five minutes into the talk, there was no chance of listening to what 
the man was saying, you were just conscious that every page turned meant such a minor 
impact on the whole manuscript that was there; and when a man finally once said, I recall, 
literally after two hours of reading in difficult English and not much better Chinese from his 
paper, he said, “I’m only going to read four of my five essays,” the feeling was [exclamatory 
laughing] “All right!” That is all I’m going to read to you. 
 
I have, however, one other aid that I want to turn to. A thing in mind again: go back to the 
morning, we’re looking at landscape, we’re looking at landscape in a personal way because our 
goal here is not just trying to either bury cities or honor cities, to praise cities or laud cities, it’s 
trying to understand “Can we learn cities, can we learn from cities?” And the environmental 
literacy that I’m trying to exhort you toward, learning environmental cues through using the 
landscape in either a nature sense, an historical sense, an artifact sense, a problem sense, a 
history sense, a wealth sense, an ideology sense, whatever system you want sense—that 
burden has to stay with you as you also look at Third World city building. The phenomenon of 
American urbanism is rather special, there are characteristics that are uniquely ours, or at least 
the Western industrialized world, because our urbanism comes out from basically changes in 
the latter part of the eighteenth century and first part of the nineteenth century. 
 
What we talk about in Third World city building is really much more akin to a process of what is 
called by economists “the demonstration effect,” whereby through telecommunications, or 
through some kind of culture broker evident in a community, you can learn something that you 
can… you can learn a new set of needs. You see somebody with a digital watch in an American 
grade school, and right away your daughter or son comes home and says, “Gosh, this watch is 
hard to read. If I had digits, I could really read it a lot more easily. If I had numbers on it that just 
flashed on…” that demonstration effect then creates a sense of a new felt need, and 
supposedly in Western society we can pride ourselves as the guy showing his Timex digital, we 
can pride ourselves in having also the discipline requisite to generate the capital and the 
opportunity necessary to generate the capital, to achieve some of these things that are 
suddenly necessities through this demonstration effect. 
 
What’s happened in the urban patterns that we seem to associate with the Third World—and 
by that I’m talking about primarily Latin American, South Asian, and… not Latin American, 
Mesoamerican… Latin American, African, and South Asian city building, primarily—is that there 
is all this sense of what the city demonstrates, whether it’s through movies, whether it’s 
through wrist watches or bicycles or transistor radios, whether it’s through government cars 
with government people with their special costumes and paraphernalia coming through a 
village community, or whether it, increasingly, is temporary seasonal employment in the city, or 
travels to the city, or visitation of kin that have gone to the city; all those things change these 
images of cities, and they tend to generally stimulate a boredom with the rural alternative and 
an anticipation and positive interest in the urban alternative. 
 
However, this demonstration effect is not characterized by an associated either pattern of or 
availability to the wherewithal that makes it possible to sustain yourself in the city. You neither 
have the education nor the capital to underwrite yourself, to grubstake yourself for a while, so 
what happens is then the city stands as a beacon, bringing people in, but it does not at the 
same time train them to effectively deal with the city, so we have the rather peculiar and 
special patterns of Third World urbanization.  
 
Now, the film I have for you, I’ve got it for two reasons. One is, it looks at the city, basically a 
Western city, in fact a West Coast city, primarily, although it’s never identified, from an alien 
point of view. It looks at the city from without a very specific context. You see it as a form of 
settlement, as a mode of ecologic adaptation that is foreign to you. And as this movie portrays 
the response to this urban space, it’s interesting to see how they read that landscape, and the 
inferences they make from that landscape reading. And the reason I’ve got the film is partly 
because it ties in with this morning’s stuff, and I think it has educational potential, maybe for 
you who are teachers, but also gives you not a bad parallel sense of how a peasant in a foreign 
scene might see the demonstration of a Western city. So let’s turn to that, and then we’ll 
proceed with the other discussion of our Third World city building. Lights and film, if you would 
please. [background noises; showing of film is omitted from recording] 
 
SALTER [resuming after film is shown]: I’m happy with this light, if you’re happy with it. It 
doesn’t matter, it’ll let those that are catching their Zs do it in more grace. [audience laughter] 
This film, though perhaps seeming curious given the context of our Third World lessons from 
the landscape, has validity in the sense that the images of the city, the things that propel and 
impell and in a sense compel the migration from the countryside to the city are as fragmentary 
as the kinds of pro data assessments aliens would get from looking at the city just from the air 
like that, because you don’t perceive in that kind of a scale the true human interaction with 
urban space that does so much, I think, to characterize Third World city building. The concept 
just of street people, for example; anyone who’s been abroad in foreign cities knows this idea 
of street people: street people and rag pickers, what are sometimes called the bottoms in a 
population, the very lowest stratum of social class. They’re the ones that have no haven in the 
city, and yet they’re the ones that are also inclined to come in.  
 
If you look back at Stanley Meisler’s opening lines: “If an African has had a few years of 
schooling, if his imagination has been excited by newspapers and the radio, if he feels a need to 
break from his traditional ways, if he wants to be modern, there is only one place he can go: the 
city, and he will go there, even when it makes no economic sense to go, to do so.” So we have 
then the problem of the city serving as a magnet, as an attractor, for a great sector of the 
population. This is not unlike the Western patterns of urbanization, except for one very critical 
difference: now as we see people leave the countryside and come to the city in American urban 
building, or Western European urbanization patterns, there is generally created a technology, a 
cost efficient technology, that will accommodate the tasks that person leaves behind as he 
leaves the rural sector. 
 
This is not the case, necessarily, in a Third World, peasant-based nation—that when someone 
leaves the workforce at the village level, two things happen. One is that the peers with whom 
he has worked, usually kinfolk, may or may not pick up the work tasks he leaves undone by 
departing. That’s one very real possibility. The second thing is, that is even more likely, when he 
arrives in the city, he will in fact certainly have food needs, food and material needs. So we 
have a double negative worked on the population by a diminishment in the labor force of the 
residual rural population that remains agrarian, and we have an increment, an increase, in the 
demands on the urban support systems. 
 
Now, that flick pointed out probably as its primary impact on you this critical nature of 
transportation, this movement, this orchestration, if you will, of resources from a tremendously 
broad network in a smooth harmony presenting the city daily and nightly, dawnly and 
continuously, with the wherewithal to support these unproductive, consuming people—
unproductive in an agrarian sense, and consuming in an all kinds of sense. The analog in the 
Third World nations is that as the man leaves, or the woman leaves, the countryside, the 
changeover has to be supported by changes in education, changes in attitude toward 
innovation, changes in the availability of an energy-costly pesticide, insecticide, and machine-
operated farm implement help, and it’s got to be associated with a very smooth market road 
system and a transportation network. 
 
These things have not happened in the same kind of a sequence that we say we had. I don’t 
know—sometimes when you read history you get the terrible feeling that… not terrible feeling, 
perhaps—but you get the sense that we’ve glossed over so much that really the analogs are 
closer than we think of them as being. The reality, we can say, is that from what we see right 
now—not looking at American and European patterns in the 1820s—from what we know right 
now, there is not the effective infrastructure created in the countryside in most Third World 
nations to accommodate the departure of these agrarian workforce peoples, nor is there, in the 
city—through either large scale industrialization or the development of tertiary sector, the 
service sector—nor are there positions to employ these people in adequate numbers. So you 
then get this broad population of street people, of shanty town people, of hangers-on, and you 
have what is called by people like Oscar Lewis a sort of village in the city, or Herbert Gans, a 
village in the city situation, where you have a rural setting that’s been left, but you carry with 
you as you go in, because you go in as a clan or you go in and become part of a clan structure, 
you take village attitudes and village mores to the city with you. 
 
Now, the impact of this: if you live as a villager in the city, and by that I mean two or three 
workers will support eight or nine adults—in the city ordinarily, you have a much tighter ratio 
between workers and adults—but in a Third World city, you can have two or three wages 
coming in to support eight or nine adults, which then diminishes the per capita money available 
for necessary consumption, and it also creates then that potentially politically unstable 
situation that is always the anxiety of city leaders. The other result of that is, when you have 
village mores being maintained in an urban setting, you deny one of the most critical factors in 
what we call the demographic transition that has really saved what little optimism Harrison 
Brown still has about future population growth. That is, as you come from the countryside to 
the city, you become involved in city ways through education, through job opportunity, through 
new patterns of consumption, through new patterns of entertainment and recreation, through 
retarding your marriage age, so that the net result of all of this is that you make a personal 
decision to have a smaller family or a later family or no family at all. This is a sociologic aspect of 
the demographic transition. 
 
When you find real changes in patterns of fertility in human populations, they relate primarily 
to that transition affected by a move from the countryside to the city. This is based on the very 
simple reality that in the countryside, the more children you have in a peasant society, the 
more wealth you have, because since you may use land really title-free, if you’ve got the 
manpower for it, the more manpower you have, the greater access you have to land; land is the 
primary resource; the products of the land are yours and your workers’, your family, so that the 
wealth relationship between child number and family prosperity is a fairly high correlative. In 
the city, in a bona fide urban situation, you have a higher cost for space, hence children are 
expensive, you have a diminished chance for children to work, because of labor laws and 
employment situations, hence children are expensive, and you have mechanisms that give you, 
very quickly, information on birth control, contraception, family planning, and they facilitate or 
fortify cultural attitudinal changes. If the village ambiance is maintained, what happens? You 
still have some sense of using the kids to go out as street hawkers, using the kids to go out as 
beggars, using the kids to work as petty thieves, using the kids to play some role and just pack 
them in, so you don’t get the same kind of impact on personal decision-making for changed 
fertility. The net result of all of this, you’ve probably seen from Harrison Brown yesterday, 
mortality goes down because the city provides better health facilities, better sewage facilities, 
better water delivery systems, better medical facilities; but the fertility maintains, in many 
ways, a lot of its peasant traditional high pattern, so that the net gap, that is net population 
growth, goes on a pace. You can’t diminish mortality rates and maintain constant fertility rates 
without realizing, of course, heavy population increase—or drop the adjective—population 
increase. The thing that’s made the cities work is that while mortality has gone for an additional 
25 to 35 per thousand in the peasant world and down to 10 or even 7 in an urban world, 
fertility, because of this demographic transition, has also gone from a 25 to 35 to 38 to 40 per 
thousand down to a 20 per thousand, or less, and that gives you then a net diminishment in 
population growth.  
 
All right, let me show you for the final graphics of the day, and then we’ll turn for a second to 
some other final comments, the Chinese examples I have, because I see the Chinese case as 
being the one case where we have a nation of some demographic significance, some 
magnitudinal significance—what a dumb phrase—a big nation [audience laughter] yeah… really 
a try, really attempt to change patterns of urbanization. From ‘57 to  ‘77, 22 years now, they 
have worked rigorously on trying to trying to control this, what I call the casual flow, the 
spontaneous flow of folks from the countryside to the city by turning them around. Let me 
show you these slides with two things in mind. One, some evidences of this, but more largely, a 
nature of what a city looks like in a society where you have some control mechanisms working 
but you still have the blatant evidence that nature as artifact, as it were, nature as history, of— 
excuse me—urban patterns that go back three and a half to four thousand years.  
 
STAFF: [off mic] These were left over.  
 
SALTER: Okay, let me show you the one slide I wanted to show you from the morning, that I 
would hope you would look at, is this one. Talking about landscape as ideology, this is the cover 
of a magazine produced in Los Angeles some years ago, and I’ve always wanted to show it to an 
Oregon audience. [audience laughter] I got a slide of it because it was so great, and I wonder if 
you can perceive what it is. [audience chattering] Yeah, it’s the Oregon-California border, isn’t 
it. Isn’t that a magnificent graphic? And it… look at it: it’s got your images of your people, 
people and their sort of material culture, the Mickey Mouse hat, the sunglasses, the motorbike, 
the motorcycle, this great, golden, bare, heavy, grinny friendliness; but just stomping down the 
pal… yeah, bags of money… stomping down the palisades with a duck quacking feebly away and 
two beavers, wondering, “What is this, what is this strange program?” on a rather pristine 
landscape, and I think in terms of trying to utilize landscape and geography for ideology, for 
culture, for history, this is one that every Oregon teacher should have access to at some point 
to work with. Sorry, I’m… 
 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Is that one going to be included with your packet?  
 
SALTER: I think… that’s a good question. My answer is yes, I think that went into the mother 
packet; if it didn’t, I’d be happy to get copies made for anybody who writes to me, and I’ll send 
it up to you at, say fifty cents a slide. These slides aren’t quite as impressive; it’s hard, in China, 
to get slides.  
 
STAFF: Do you want the rest of the morning ones?  
 
SALTER: No, no, let’s go on… okay, thank you. It’s good to leave them hungry, you’ll have to 
wonder what it is you’ve missed on those last morning slides. Yes, this is… this is better. 
Chinese, you see, were doing a… [audience laughter] doing a pun here on Chinese graphics. 
[laughter erupts] If you dig a hole through the earth… all right, okay.  
 
Think for a second, a minute here about the general flow that we’re talking about in this theory 
of rural-urban migration. The whole phenomenon that underlies all of our concerns about 
urbanism, whether it’s this morning’s urban enigma, or whether it’s this afternoon’s lessons 
from the landscape, it all relates to this process of people deciding not to be on the farms, 
rather people deciding to go to the cities.  
 
Let me give you an example from my own fieldwork. When I was teaching English in Taiwan for 
a couple of years after college in the early 1960s, I got to know a number of students who were 
the children of farming families, and were studying English at […], a little school that I taught at 
outside of [...], Taichung. And I went back four or five years later to finish up some Ph.D. 
fieldwork, and I found out that the farmlands where my friends’ parents had lived were now 
factory lands. The city had grown out and eaten up the lands. I was able to find the parents of 
one of my students, who was then doing a doctorate at Princeton, and I sought them out in the 
city of Taichung, and went to them saying, “Hey, what a shame,” because they had farmed that 
land, it was classed double-A paddy land, they let me plant part of a rice paddy one time to sort 
of learn the process, and I went in feeling very sympathetic to this urban push demanding that 
they turn to something else. And I learned more in three minutes than I had learned in the prior 
three years, because they said, “Why are you feeling sorry for us? We are so glad to be out of 
the muck, so happy to not be farming any longer. The freedom of being able just to run a 
bicycle repair shop”—which is what they were doing—"and we close on Sundays now, we close 
on Wednesdays, we close when we want to, we close during Chinese New Year, we’re making 
more money, we get up at seven as opposed to five, we have our… the folks hang around at 
night when we’re doing work and it’s all very comfortable.” And I had sort of this Pearl Buck 
image of the “Good Earth” and the tenacity of the earth and the people and the wonders of 
their joy with it, bam, right out the window in a beautiful bit of learning. 
 
I think this is, perhaps in response to your speculative question this morning, what we’re able 
to extrapolate from the last three thousand years: if you give a farmer an alternative, if you give 
a farmer an alternative, by and large, he’ll get out of farming and into the city, or into the 
suburb. And the farmers who remain today, with exception in America, say the Appalachian 
farmers and some Mormon farmers and some people that do it almost in a Thoreauian sense, 
the farmers that remain are really urbanites working the factories—to use Carry McWilliams’ 
term—the factories and the fields. They’re using corporate technology, they all have CPAs… 
they don’t all have CPAs… many of them have CPAs working for them, the children have 
degrees out of ag extension schools, and they are really urbanites just in a rural setting, rural in 
the sense that it’s food-producing. 
 
This is the dynamic that we’re talking about. Look at our environment here. We have a cluster 
of four things—and you can make this up almost in any way—this is an article by a man named 
[...] in which he’s just saying that migration flow works within an environment of technology, 
transportation, communications, and mechanisation on one side, and the most important 
aspect there is the idea of communication, because… I remember you said there was a… [aside, 
to someone nearby] that thing, eh? Okay. That’s wonderful. [audience laughter] Did you guys… 
okay, alright. That’ll take care of your children. [audience laughter] The thing that’s important 
here is communication, because it’s the feedback mechanism; it’s the person who makes the 
first move is the person that’s the most exciting. Christopher Columbus is important not 
because he floated across with three leaky ships from the Iberian Peninsula to wherever he 
landed, but because he was the first one to basically try it, as far as we know. He got history’s 
position as the first. Who knows who came within the second time, who knows who the people 
were who came in the trips two, three, and four, before Columbus died? No one knows, very 
few care, very few care and no one knows. It’s the first move, because once you get there you 
send back the news of what you’ve seen. If you read Columbus’s first letter, to complete the 
example, it’s filled with wonderful prevarications, wonderful dishonesty about the things he’s 
seen, because he knows the impact of the feedback of what he’s seen will fund or not fund 
what happens next year when he goes to Queen Isabella and to Ferdinand again and tries to 
organize route two or trip two.  
 
The environment also, governmental policies, ag practices, mechanization, population 
movement, that is, the kinds of things that come through an educational system, an 
administrative system, those have impact on the decision. The environment and the social 
welfare, development, education, and health, what does the person know about how the city 
will accommodate him is important in this Third World migration, and finally, the environment 
in terms of economic conditions: wages, prices, et cetera. These are the kinds of variables that 
play in the decision making process. You know the process yourselves, because if you’re 
urbanites, you’ve thought about moving to Camas Swale, or to Drain, or to Dorena Reservoir, to 
Cottage Grove; and if you live in Cottage Grove, or Camas Swale, or Drain, or Dorena Reservoir, 
you think about maybe coming to Salem. If you’re an Angelino, you think about coming to 
Oregon, if you’re Oregonian you think, “I wish the freeway went around the state and up to 
Washington.” All of these things, there’s always thought about the migration thing, this shows 
some of the mechanisms. The various things that work inside this decision-making system 
relate basically to positive and negative feedback channels: positive, there is a job, negative, 
the police bust us every night here.  
 
STAFF: Push the button and you have your light.  
 
SALTER: Thank you, I just… alright. The light shows positive feedback and negative feedback. If 
you keep your eyes open, you can see those things without my instruction. The migration 
channel is the axis, they form the axis of this kind of a scheme, simply meaning that people will 
know where to go when they come into town. By word of mouth, they’ll know where they can 
get grubsteak, they’ll know where they can get the cheapest food. The whole mechanism has a 
very social, and hence village-like, expression of communication that leads to a decision to 
migrate, and if migrating, the decision to stay at a certain place. This could be—when you get 
this out of your little packet—this can be turned into any city that you want, any situation that 
you want, trying to role play what would happen as different people play different positions in 
this scheme. All right.  
 
This is the kind of scene that they’re fleeing from. Here’s a Northern Mexico village, on a 
summer afternoon, it’s this kind of environment—and I don’t mean this in any specific, 
pejorative way—but it’s this general sense of the lethargy, the quietness of the rural scene that 
seems to lead toward a looking for the high life, looking for shoes, jazz, school, and cash. This is 
the outer ring, or sometimes the inner ring, into which the migrant first is accommodated: that 
moving into the city, he seldom—because he’s coming from either a subsistence economy or 
even perhaps a virtually non-cash economy—he finds himself little able to, because of 
education level or urban opportunity, to pay for his way, so he locates in the shanty towns that 
are put together by catch-all stuff that comes away from what we call “midnight auto supply” in 
American culture, what is otherwise known as just “catch as catch can,” in terms of organizing a 
landscape. 
 
You have this as one of the networks of news about what’s happened from other migrants as 
they’ve gone into the city: here’s a village washing facility in a Third World country, and it’s at 
places like this, people will talk about a sister that’s gone into work at a textile factory in the 
capital city, or that’s gone in to be a prostitute, or a man that’s gone in to get a job in a noodle 
restaurant, and may in fact have enough money soon to get his own mobile noodle stand, that 
makes him an independent broker and hawker. News goes back and forth this way about 
opportunities in the city. And then you have this again: you have marginal operations that 
require almost no capital input to sustain these street people as they try to locate themselves. 
Here’s a doctor’s office… oh wait, no, this isn’t a doctor’s office at all. Here’s a little meat 
market, a simple operation with a scale and a stand and a few hooks and some conversation, 
enough money to buy a side of pork in the morning. And you get this thing, this same scene 
that is not unlike a Western city, and it has all that can be used, I could just give you that slide in 
the morning session and say, “Now, give me the litany of all the things that are wrong with 
urbanism,” and you could use that slide as a guideline. 
 
In the same sense, though, this is the corpus—no pun intended—this is the corpus that does 
attract so many of the Third World migrants. And you find, if you study it more carefully, it has 
softer edges to it: one of the rooftops in that Canton landscape has a little garden complex to it, 
it was used, one of the days that I saw it, for a dance troupe to practice dancing on it, you could 
hear the music coming up. There are amenities that are evident upon further exploration. You 
look down and you can see a variety of little gazebos and sort of Marlon Brando “On The 
Waterfront”-like spaces in the top of the city. 
 
This is for the research that you’re going to do after today, as is that, too.  
 
All right, let’s talk. I’m more concerned with images because images… you’ll think more on, 
graphs you just close up on. Look at them though, and study them yourself, make someone 
learn them. The city has this kind of a duality. Here’s a shot of Peking, and you have in the 
foreground the regular one-story, two-story brick, galvanized tin, sometimes tile, sometimes 
even thatch housing, you have some tree greenery. That’s one mode of a city. That generates 
one image, that’s thought of in terms of economics, primarily in the Third World, but you also 
have as the catalyst for much of the migration and perhaps the catalyst for the beginnings of 
cities, this great, imperial, majestic, and absolutely unusual mode. That is the forbidden city. 
Excuse me… that lies in the middle there with the gold tile roofs, which suggest that a city 
always has two sides to it, at least two. One of them, the mundane, pedestrian, somewhat 
fearful one; and the other is the awe-full, A-W-E hyphen F-U-L-L, the awe-full aspects of the 
city. The great, monumental architecture, the ceremonial centers, the sacred centers. These are 
the things that give you that little extra feeling about what mankind has done, and those 
function very actively, constantly, in the decision to come to a city. 
 
It’s this kind of thing that represents part of the grandeur of an imperial city, and most all cities 
have some little evidences of such grandeur, whether it’s a local cathedral, a church, or 
whether it is a especially nice hotel and the gardens out in front of it, or whether it’s a very nice 
teahouse and coffee house. You get some sense of there being amenities beyond the other 
horrors. You get this kind of social electricity. 
 
This is a… in Peking, a card display. That’s a crowd of tens of thousands of people there 
displaying their cards, and the synchronized way you have dancers in the middle, swaying back 
and forth, creating a sort of vicarious thrill at the organization of man, the power that man has 
in not only organizing cities’ hardware, the space, the concrete aspects of the city, but 
organizing himself and being organized himself into that kind of unison. 
 
You have, sometimes, a funny lag factor of the present and the past. Here’s an old palace in 
Southwest China. Inside the palace grounds, where you have one of the old, great stone 
animals guarding a guardhouse down here, and the grain is just next to it, and in the 
foreground you have a girl carrying out two buckets of night soil in the morning, one going back 
to an imperial past, the other going back to a neolithic past, when night soil was initially seen as 
a tremendous human resource for making these cities pay for themselves, making these cities 
sustain themselves.  
 
One of the things I was pleased to see in trying to compare Taiwan and the mainland: in 
Taiwan, many street corners in the cities have concrete pill boxes about six feet tall and about 
five feet in diameter with two entrances, and they’re maybe five-inch-thick concrete. They’re 
just like silo sections, if you had a very sharp knife and went through a silo and then put them 
around the city with a lid on, you’d have the idea. They were there for air raid shelters. 
However, there has not been an attack since ‘57, and I was there in ‘61 and then ‘69, and in the 
interim they’ve been used primarily as privies, and the decision you always had to make as 
you’re standing by them was if you saw a MiG-17 coming straight at you strafing, you would 
decide whether to step inside there and shield yourself, or take your chances with the machine 
gunner. In the mainland you get the same kind of thing: here’s an old Ming dynasty guard 
house, and you’d rather deal with that animal than deal with the inside of that. Alright, more of 
the same thing.  
 
A city trying to deal with the problem of sewage, a contemporary problem in all urban centers. 
The Chinese, almost unique in the world, now, handling it in a more productive way than any 
other culture, and that’s night soil being poured into a barge, being collected, because the 
reality that Chinese servants face in this agripolitan goal they have of trying to make 
countryside and cityside appear the same, is to sustain themselves not by transport linkages 
that go hundreds and thousands of miles away to bring food in, but to seldom go even scores of 
kilometers away. Shanghai, with between nine and eleven million people, is allegedly 
supported by a truck farming industry that falls 95% within a fifty kilometer radius. Nine to 
eleven million people, bigger than any city in our country except one, supporting itself by a 
radius that’s less far than from here to Salem. Whereas we pump lettuce into the New York 
metropolitan dawn markets daily in California, and it’s a different kind of concept. This is one of 
the reasons: highly productive truck farming right on the margins of the city. 
 
And you have, then, also the resources being utilized more fully in this water body; rather than 
drain it away and asphalt it, it becomes kind of like a Venice, and the barges that work on it are 
like three-wheeled trucks or four-wheeled trucks that move the goods to the city with no 
pollution at all, of an airborne sense, and the water is no better… no worse than the Cuyahoga 
river in Cleveland; it doesn’t burn, anyway. The city itself is free of cars, by and large, but 
nothing is simple in life. Where they don’t have cars, they put in bicycles, or they put in trolleys. 
The curious street pattern in China is that they’ve been able to handle in many cases the large 
scale difficulties with pollution-generating sources, the point source generations of say, stacks, 
that they can easily cleanse and scrub. But they have the ubiquitous hibachi, or the little cooker 
there; and most of the families of Shanghai will step out at dawn, as they will in Suzhou and 
Changyuan and Beijing and everywhere else, and they’ll cook their breakfast with soft coal 
tablets on these things, which creates a horrible pall in the first fifteen feet of the atmosphere, 
from ground level to about the crowns of the trees, so you’re walking through this grit. And the 
perception, then, is that the air is much worse in the Chinese cities than it is in Los Angeles, and 
yet China gets a much better press on its environmental controls because it has cleaned its 
scrubbers, or scrubbed its cleaners, and in reality you have this kind of a problem which is very 
hard to solve. Natural gas is not a part of the Chinese urban scene. 
 
You get also the problem of drays, the technology revolution that makes us move as that movie 
has shown with such effectiveness, on our goods transport. In China, you’re still involved with a 
great deal of hand-pulled carts, or trucks that take up most of the space, or animal-pulled carts, 
or bicycles, all of which can clog up a street just as badly as two thousand cars, one person 
each, between the Crenshaw and the Western off-ramp.  
 
Looking down at some of the landscape on a larger scale, you get some of the ironies that make 
up a Third World landscape. Here we’re looking out of a twelfth-century temple down on a 
bomb shelter being built right now, under what will be, future, an urban park, and you wonder 
about the resources. That resource is made even more complex by the fact that part of the 
stone going into that bomb shelter is derived from the Great Wall, and the Great Wall was built 
defensively some two thousand years ago to close out the enemy, and that same rock which so 
futilely tried to close out the Mongolian hordes, the Genghis and Kublai Khan and their ilk, is 
now being recycled, as it were, into Peking air raid shelters. Here’s the wall, in fact… You may 
say you can see, wait’ll you see these things somewhere else, you’ll get double your money. 
This is the Great Wall as it really exists, that is, in disrepair and collapsing. The linkages you 
always see are like this, and behind this man along the five-kilometer strand that has been very 
nicely maintained, and accommodates a tremendous tourist rush in China. 
 
But this wall idea is important because it represents a use of local resources that goes back to 
what California, and certainly Oregon even before California, has been concerned with, not only 
in urban terms but in social terms, and that is appropriate technology, the idea of utilizing local 
resources and utilizing them at a scale that involves human labor and human satisfaction in the 
process of such activity. The walls of China are wonderful comment on using local mud and 
stone to create a sense of internal city strength and internal city pride, and it did have some 
obvious manifestations for defense. These exist today as relics of a past and continue as city 
walls, sort of landscape as artifact. And the Chinese, as they rebuild their cities, which literally 
they’re doing bit by bit, take down some of this block, leaving some of the walls for museums—
living museums—and use much of the other block to redo parts of the urban landscape to 
accommodate some of the new populations that have been moved into the city or have grown 
into it.  
 
Here’s an outside market, still a part of a Third World city scene. Just something to suggest that 
even the Pearl River is… it has not been so highly organized, and well communized, that it 
doesn’t serve in an aesthetic sense, as well as this old man, as many Chinese still having the 
leisure to just ponder the flow of time and water below a new bridge put in by the communists 
over the Pearl River. We get, then, in regular street scenes, in a Third World, the images that 
you get would probably, if I had you do a mental map of Third World city scenes, would have 
narrow streets, you might not have the power lines that are, in fact, very important in the Third 
World scene. Notice here the bamboo poles pushed from one side of the street to the other 
with clothes hung through them, so they can blow in the wind without falling off, or be stolen. 
You get the same kind of confused architecture and cluttered sense that you get in most city 
space. 
 
The real problem the Chinese face, and aggressively dealt with, is this street people population, 
this hanging-around population. Here’s the Bund in Shanghai, the wall along the Huangpu Creek 
that conflues later on with the Yangtze River, the great river in China, and there is just this 
sense. I don’t know if any of you are, or were, Star Trek fans, if you were you’ll recall 
immediately, because Star Trek was like this, the image of one of the series, when Captain Kirk 
fell in love with a woman that was transported on board, who was very lovely and wanted to 
get infected by him, so she could return to her planet and spread a plague through her planet 
because… and the portal opened, you looked down, and there was just total people, just total 
people milling around, just lots of folk. And you get some of that sense in the Chinese city, and 
this is after hsia fang and migration control, giving you a sense of “it is no minor problem.” And 
China is certainly not unique in it, the thing that China is unique in, although Indonesia has tried 
this, too, and some countries to a much lesser degree, China has stopped, basically through the 
control of people by the ID card, which if they are not where they should be, disallows them 
their monthly rice ration, cotton ration, peanut oil ration, nor are they easily able to get either 
employment or residence. So the migration is very tightly controlled. 
We end up then with a city like Daxing, a new city, a refining city built around oil resources in 
Manchuria, or what is called Dongbei, the far northeast; you get a city like this that has all of its 
land between factories given over to farming so that you get a sense of both rural activity and 
urban activity, an interfacing of the two. You see, if you were going to—ach, sorry—if you were 
going to stop the migration flow between the countryside and the city—not between—from 
the countryside to the city in the Third World, you’ve got to stop the cultural appreciation of 
the city as being the better place to be. China’s trying to do this by having the burdens happen 
in an equal sense in both places. We end up with a cartoon like this, then, that represents ideal 
Chinese space, where you have a city laid out totally in a human grid, taking us back to the first 
point of this morning’s lecture; we’re talking about the most artificial environments man has 
ever created. We’re talking about the very pinnacle of human planning as we look at cities 
today, because they represent an accretion of individual human decisions. The Chinese have 
tried to make this decision a little differently, by having… follow the light… farmland, nursery 
beds, crop land, tree crops, street plantings, transportation linkages, water storage, more tree 
plantings, more crop land, and basically a factory and residential grid, all within one new center. 
That is, as I say, I call the agripolitan center—“agri” as in agricultural, “politan” as in 
metropolitan—the agripolitan center, representing the ideal culmination of a philosophy of 
classlessness, and a spatial geometry of diminished, if not disappearing, class differentiation. 
The classes being rural folk and city folk.  
 
All right, I’m going to stop there, and I have a handout I’ll give you at the beginning of our 
discussion time. I’d be happy to entertain any questions then, after your break.    
 
[distant background noises; about 90 seconds of silence on tape before program ends] 
 
 
